John Locke
Για τους εμπειριστές η βασική ανθρώπινη γνώση πηγάζει από τις αισθήσεις. Το πλατωνικό – και καρτεσιανό- δόγμα περί «έμφυτων ιδεών» απορρίπτεται. —————————- Ο John Locke θεμελιωτής του ΕΜΠΕΙΡΙΣΜΟΥ, γεννημένος το […]
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Preliminary discussion of the absurdity giving equal status in principle to souls and bodies as realities
§62. Preliminary discussion of the absurdity giving equal status in principle to souls and bodies as realities; indication of the difference in principle between the temporality, the causality, and the […]
John Locke
John Locke:An Essay Concerning Human Understanding1690 Overview: Few, if any, books have had as great an impact on the history of thought on the nature of human consciousness as John […]
Berkeley’s view of language underlies his attack on Locke’s ‘abstract general ideas’ [ibid. 6-18]. He supposes Locke to be saying that we can have ideas (that is, images) not only […]
The complex ideas of substances (man, horse, tree) are formed as follows: The mind observes that a certain number of simple ideas, conveyed in by the different senses, constantly go […]
JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704)
Works Essay Concerning Human Understanding 1690 Two Treatises on Government 1690 Some Thoughts concerning Education 1693 The Reasonableness of Christianity 1695. Philosophy Epistemology Locke attempted a synthesis of Bacon and […]
Berkeley reduces the bodily things to the complexes of sense-data
LOCKE’S NAÏVETÉS and inconsistencies lead to a rapid further development of his empiricism, which pushes toward a paradoxical idealism and finally ends in a consummated absurdity. The foundation continues to […]
our human science depends exclusively on our representations and concept-formations
It is also of interest that the Lockean scepticism in respect to the rational ideal of science, and its limitation of the scope of the new sciences (which are supposed […]
For Locke the soul is something self-contained and real by itself
Especially portentous for future psychology and theory of knowledge is the fact that Locke makes no use of the Cartesian first introduction of the cogitatio as cogitatio of cogitata – […]
Locke senses nothing of the depths of the Cartesian epoche [critique] and of the reduction to the ego. He simply takes over the ego as soul, which becomes acquainted, in […]
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