This inward-turned psychology stood in the service of the transcendental problem that had been awakened by Descartes, although this problem was not grasped in genuine form and properly formulated by […]
For Husserl it is “universally dominant naturalism” (Hus IX 267) which impedes recognition of transcendental subjectivity as a “field of transcendental experience” (Hus IX 269). Overcoming naturalism is made possible […]
All of modern philosophy, in the original sense of a universal ultimately grounding science, is, according to our presentation, at least since Kant and Hume, a single struggle between two […]
The subjectivity which itself constitutes all (real and ideal) objectivity cannot be psychological subjectivity, not even that psychological subjectivity which eidetically and in phenomenological purity is the topic of psychological […]
What is left, says Husserl, is transcendental subjectivity, “the pure act-process with its own essence” (“das reine Akterlebnis mit seinem eigenen Wesen“).