Preliminary discussion of the absurdity giving equal status in principle to souls and bodies as realities

§62. Preliminary discussion of the absurdity giving equal status in principle to souls and bodies as realities; indication of the difference in principle between the temporality, the causality, and the individuation of natural things and those of souls.

Προκαταρκτικη συζητηση της ανοησιας που δινει ισο εξ αρχης καθεστως στις ψυχες και τα σωματα ως πραγματικοτητες’ ενδειξη της εξ αρχης διαφορας αναμεσα στη ΧΡΟΝΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ, στην ΑΙΤΙΟΤΗΤΑ, και την ΕΞΑΤΟΜΙΚΕΥΣΗ των ΦΥΣΙΚΩΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ και των ΨΥΧΩΝ.

Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology
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ΑΛΛΑ ΕΧΟΥΝ ΟΙ ΨΥΧΕΣ ΧΩΡΟ-ΧΡΟΝΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΑΛΗΘΙΝΗ ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑ … ΟΠΩΣ ΤΑ ΣΩΜΑΤΑ;

(But do souls have spatio-temporality in the true sense, in existence in this form, as do bodies?)

———Η ΨΥΧΗ ΩΣ ΟΝΤΟΤΗΤΑ (an isolated space, a writing tablet)———-

– The soul is something self-contained and real by itself, as is a body; in naive naturalism the soul is now taken to be like an isolated space, like a writing tablet, in [Locke’s ] famous simile, on which psychic data come and go.

————-DATA-SENSATIONALISM—-OUTER/INNER———-

– This data-sensationalism, together with the doctrine of outer and inner sense, dominates psychology and the theory of knowledge for centuries, even up to the present day; and in spite of the familiar struggle against “psychic atomism,” the basic sense of this doctrine does not change.

—-ΣΤΟΝ LOCKE ΛΕΙΠΕΙ ΤΟ COGITATIO———-
– Of course one speaks quite unavoidably, even in the Lockean terminology, of perceptions, representations “of” things, or of believing “in something,” willing “something,” and the like. But no consideration is given to the fact that in the perceptions, in the experiences of consciousness themselves, that of which we are conscious is included as such – that the perception is in itself a perception of something, of “this tree.”

————-INNER/OUTER: HUSSERL vs. DESCARTES—————
ΓΙΑΥΤΟ Ο HUSSERL ΙΣΧΥΡΙΖΕΤΑΙ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΑ ΣΤΟΝ DESCARTES ΟΤΙ ΤΟ ΑΛΗΘΙΝΟ ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΧΙ ΠΩΣ ΝΑ ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΝΟΥΜΕ (INFER) ΤΟΝ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟ ΚΟΣΜΟ ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ ΜΟΥ ΑΛΛΑ “ΕΑΝ ΑΝΑΦΟΡΙΚΑ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΕΓΩΛΟΓΙΚΗ ΣΦΑΙΡΑ ΕΝΑ ‘ΕΞΩ’ ΕΧΕΙ ΚΑΠΟΙΟ ΝΟΗΜΑ.”

(That is why Husserl claims against Descartes that the true question is not how to infer the external world from my interiority but “whether with regard to the egological sphere an ‘outside’ has any meaning at all.”)

[Husserl, E., Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, ed. by Walter Biemel [Husserliana VI] (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1962), p. 82.]

———Selbst-Zeitigung——————
So, the intentionality of the subject derives from the original gesture of Selbst-Zeitigung, which is an Ur-Faktum that precedes any constitutions and, for this reason, is the Ur-Quelle for each sense and meaning. [http://www.newschool.edu/nssr/husserl/Future/Part%20One/Zippel.html]
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Die Selbstzeitigung des transzendentalen Ego. 〈Epoché, Reduktion auf die strömende Gegenwart und primordiale Reduktion: Das Primordium als Stätte der Konstitution der weltlichen Zeitmodalitäten〉

——ΟΛΗ Η ΑΠΟΒΛΕΠΤΙΚΗ ΕΜΠΕΙΡΙΑ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΥΣΙΩΔΩΣ ΜΙΑ ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΧΡΟΝΙΚΗΣ ΑΠΟΒΛΕΠΤΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ.—-

Husserl’s intentional analyses lead him ultimately to the insight that all intentional experience [intentionale Erlebnisse] is essentially a modification of temporal intentionality,

cf., Husserliana X. Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstesens (1893-1917), Edited by Rudolf Boehm (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), Translated by John Barnett Brough as Collected Works Vol. IV. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).
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Η ΥΠΕΡΒΑΤΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΛΟΓΙΑ

However, as a transcendental philosophy, Husserlian phenomenology is ultimately interested in the possibility conditions and foundations for justified knowledge (what Kant called the quid juris of our knowledge); not factual, empirical, descriptions of psychological processes. ——

ΑΝΑΖΗΤΑ

[
1) ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΕΝΗ ΓΝΩΣΗ

2) ΟΧΙ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΓΕΓΟΝΟΤΟΣ, ΕΜΠΕΙΡΙΚΕΣ ΠΕΡΙΓΡΑΦΕΣ ΨΥΧΟΛΟΓΙΚΩΝ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΩΝ]

———
ΤΑ ΟΡΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΣΥΓΧΡΟΝΗΣ ΓΝΩΣΙΑΚΗΣ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΣ (COGNITIVE SCIENCE)

– ΝΑ ΠΕΡΙΒΑΛΛΕΙ ΟΛΕΣ ΤΙΣ ΙΔΙΟΤΗΤΕΣ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΠΟΥ ΚΑΝΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΣΥΝΕΙΔΗΣΗ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΑ ΑΥΤΟ-ΣΥΝΕΙΔΗΤΗ

– Η ΝΑ ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΙ ΕΝΑ ΚΑΘΑΡΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑΛΙΣΤΙΚΟ ΠΡΟΤΥΠΟ ΣΤΟ ΟΠΟΙΟ ΜΠΟΡΕΙ ΝΑ ΑΝΑΧΘΕΙ Η ΣΥΝΕΙΔΗΣΗ

(At this point let us reflect that modern cognitive science is currently very far from able:

– to account for all the properties of what makes consciousness intrinsically self-aware

– or provide any purely physicalist model to which consciousness can be reduced.)

Πηγή: http://www.newschool.edu/nssr/husserl/Future/Part%20One/Tassone.html
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REPRESENTATIONALISM

In a significant point of agreement with Husserl, and Heidegger as well, Searle rejects the idea that the object of an intentional state is a mental representation.

Since what is most revolutionary about the phenomenological theory of intentionality is precisely its abandonment of all traces of a mental representation that is supposed to mediate between consciousness and our knowledge of the external world, Searle, on this point, is more phenomenologically relevant than he is perhaps willing to admit.

Consider, for example, the following observation by Searle on the nature of the intentional object, take from his work Intentionality (p. 16):

“To call something an Intentional object is just to say that is what some Intentional state is about. Thus, for example, if Bill admires President Clinton, then the Intentional object of his admiration is President Carter, the actual man and not some shadowy intermediate entity between Bill and the man.”

[http://www.newschool.edu/nssr/husserl/Future/Part%20One/KimReuter.html]

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