Our use of ‘act’ differs essentially from the favoured use of the later Husserl, who excludes from the notion of an act any ‘extra-experiential’ or ‘non-phenomenological’ elements that may be […]
A crucial element of Husserl’s early work in the Philosophy of Arithmetic is his critique of psychologism; it is this critique that is continued in his Logical Investigations and which […]
Η double-intentionality του Husserl ΘΕΜΑΤΟΠΟΙΕΙ 1) ΤΗΝ ΧΡΟΝΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΑΤΟΜΙΚΩΝ ΒΙΩΜΑΤΩΝ (π.χ. ΑΚΟΥΓΩΝΤΑΣ ΜΙΑ ΠΡΟΤΑΣΗ) – an account of the temporality of individual experiences (e.g., listening to a sentence) 2) […]
The present paper, for all its talk of acts, is not an exercise in Husserlian phenomenology, i.e. in the description of those parts or moments of acts that are transparent […]
It is Husserl’s own application of his theory of species and dependence to the problem of linguistic meaning which will engage our attention for the remainder of this paper. Husserl’s […]
“1. One of the characteristic features of modern ontology relates to the distinction between a Dasein and a Sosein of objects — that is, between the existence of objects and […]
What is left, says Husserl, is transcendental subjectivity, “the pure act-process with its own essence” (“das reine Akterlebnis mit seinem eigenen Wesen“).