By an act Husserl means

Our use of ‘act’ differs essentially from the favoured use of the later Husserl, who

excludes from the notion of an act any ‘extra-experiential’ or ‘non-phenomenological’ elements that may be connected with them. By an act Husserl means just that component of an intentional event of consciousness that the subject himself can discern by ‘reflecting’ on his experience, excluding empirical facts about the intended object and its de facto relation to the subject. Hence, an act is just what we might call the ‘experiential’ component of an intentional event, ‘purified’ (as Husserl says) of presumptions concerning its ‘interlacing with nature’ (Woodruff Smith and McIntyre 1982:3).

Barry Smith, Husserl, Language, and the Ontology of the Act (http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/hloa.html)

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