the problem of anchorage, i.e., the problem of the relation of the noema to concrete objects. (How can a mental act, in somehow grasping an abstract noema, thereby be directed […]
Phenomenology Lectures 2008-9: Husserl (II) via: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctysar/ Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality (CM 2) In CM 2, Husserl makes a few comments about the ‘new science’ that he thinks the epoche […]
Sometime after the publication of the Logical Investigations, Husserl himself abandoned the theory of linguistic meaning as species and introduced a new view of meanings as special abstract entities, which […]
Noemata have three different levels: The substratum, which is never presented to the consciousness, and is the support of all the properties of the object; The noematic senses, which are […]
At the noetic pole, the purely affirming ego eludes the grasp of consciousness; so does the pure sense of the thing itself, at the noematic pole.