the problem of anchorage, i.e., the problem of the relation of the noema to concrete objects. (How can a mental act, in somehow grasping an abstract noema, thereby be directed […]
Phenomenology Lectures 2008-9: Husserl (II) via: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctysar/ Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality (CM 2) In CM 2, Husserl makes a few comments about the ‘new science’ that he thinks the epoche […]
Phenomenology Lectures: Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) via: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctysar/ Lecture One (An overview of H’s life and works (& a video of him at 77) are at http://www.husserlpage.com.) I The phenomenological epoche […]
All mental phenomena have in common, Brentano argues, “that they are only perceived in inner consciousness, while in the case of physical phenomena only external perception is possible” (Psychology, 91). […]
Moreover, the truth of the judgment is neither equivalent to nor dependent upon the psychological experience of clear evidence that accompanies the mental act embracing it.
Mental acts transpire in time: they begin and end, and they can be repeated and individually counted. Numbers, in contrast, are timeless.