Let us take a closer look at what meaning is supposed to /do. /In the
beginning of the Sixth Investigation it is laconically stated that “The
‘generality of the word’ means, therefore, that the unified sense of one
and the same word covers (or, in the case of a nonsense word, purports
to cover) an /ideally delimited manifold of possible intuitions, /each
of which could serve as the basis for an act of recognitive naming
endowed with the same sense.”(LI, 691 -92 [Hua XIX, 563], our italics).
This is exemplified as so often before in the word “red”: “To the word
‘red’ corresponds the possibility of both knowing as, and calling ‘red’,
all red objects that might be given in possible intuitions. This
possibility leads, with an /a priori /guarantee, to the further
possibility of becoming aware, through an /identifying synthesis /of all
such naming recognitions, of a sameness of meaning of one with the
other: this /A /is red, and that /A /is /the same, /i.e., /also /red:
the two intuited singulars belong under the same ‘concept’.” (ibid.).
The bound variation of the species meaning in question may singularize
it in particular instantiations. Thus, it is the opposite operation of
the variation undertaken in the abstraction process’s isolation of the
species in the first place.
FREDERIK STJERNFELT, CATEGORIES, DIAGRAMS, SCHEMATA – THE COGNITIVE GRASPING OF IDEAL OBJECTS IN HUSSERL AND PEIRCE in DAN ΖAHAVI AND FREDERIK STJERNFELT (EDS.), ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF PHENOMENOLOGY, Husserl’s /Logical Investigations /Revisited, p. 154
eidetisch 