APPERCEPTION (Apperzeption) {επαναντίληψη}. 1. Apperception is the “perception” that accompanies direct perception (Perzeption). There are two aspects to apperception. The first is the act’s interpretive apprehension of the presenting or representing contents really inhering in the act. The second refers to the fact—at least within Husserl’s developed theory of inner time-consciousness after about 1907–1909—that within the momentary phase of a perception (Wahrnehmung), only primal impression animates hyletic data, that is, only primal impression directly grasps the genuinely appearing side or aspect of the object. However, the perceiver is also perceptually aware of the just seen and still to be perceived sides or aspects of the object as well as other objects spatially or thematically related to the perceived object. The awareness of the not directly perceived sides and of thematically related objects forms the horizon of what is directly perceived. This awareness is made possible by the two other moments of the momentary phase, namely, retention and protention. The second aspect of apperception, then, is the perceptual awareness, the “perceiving,” of the not directly perceived sides or aspects of the object as well as the spatial and thematic background of what is perceived.
2. “Apperception” is also used in a wider sense beyond the analysis of perceptual experiences to designate those moments of an experience that grasp other aspects of the same object as well as related objects in the horizon of the experienced object.
3. “Apperception” can also refer to what is apperceived. Whereas the directly perceived side or aspect (a “perception” in the sense of a percept) is perceived, the not directly perceived sides or aspects—the just perceived and yet to be perceived sides and aspects (the “apperception” in the sense of an “appercept”)—are apperceived. See also APPRESENTATION; INTUITION; PRESENTATION (Gegenwärtigung); RE-PRESENTATION (Vergegenwärtigung).
John J. Drummond, Historical Dictionary of Husserl’s Philosophy, p. 39
Apperception (Apperzeption, Vergegenwärtigung) See also appresentation, presentification
For Husserl, an apperception (Apperzeption) always presupposes and is founded on a perception (see CM § 55). To apperceive means to grasp something over and above what is actually perceived. Apperceptions accompany and form part of perceptions. The term ‘apperception’ is used by Descartes, Kant and Leibniz. In Brentano, an apperception is founded on a perception. In perception, there is a direct experience of the self-givenness of the object. In apperception, there is a sense that the object is mediated through something else that is presented immediately. For instance, in all perception of a physical object, direct perception is of the facing side of the object, the hidden sides of the object are apperceived or appresented in an empty manner. Perception involves a horizon of sense that is co-intended and appresented. In his Passive Synthesis lectures, Husserl defines apperception as ‘a consciousness of having something that is not present in the original’ (APS, 367; Hua XI 234), Apperception involves a certain awareness of properties, profiles, horizons that are not sensuously given in the perceiving itself, e.g. if I am in a room, I am aware not only of the objects that are inside the room, but also of the building in which I am. This connection between presence and absence is crucial for phenomenology. There are not only apperceptions of the things and the world but also of the self and others. Our interests, customs, convictions, judgements, etc. are grasped ‘apperceptively’ (Crisis, § 59). Husserl employs the term ‘presenilation’ or ‘presentification’ (Vergegenwärtigung) to cover a huge range of experiences including memories, fantasies, anticipations, awareness of the hidden side of a physical object, and so on: There are different levels of apperception corresponding to different layers of objective sense’ (CM § 50, 111; Hua I 141). Husserl says that an apperception does not involve inference (CM § 51). For Husserl, seeing another living body as a subject or cogito is a typical example of an apperception.
Dermot Moran and Joseph Cohen, The Husserl Dictionary, pp. 39-40
Apperception is our
surplus, which is found in experience itself, in its descriptive content
as opposed to the raw existence of sense: it is the act-character which
as it were ensouls sense, and is in essence such as to make us perceive
this or that object, see this tree, e.g., hear this ringing, smell this
scent of flowers etc. etc. /Sensations, /and the acts ‘interpreting’
them or apperceiving them, are alike experienced, /but they do not
appear as objects: /they are not seen, heard or /perceived /by any
sense. /Objects /on the other hand, appear and are perceived, but they
are not /experienced. /Naturally we exclude the case of adequate perception.
Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 2, p. 105
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