But then we
15 are in an uncomfortable situation—precisely that of transcendental
solipsism. For is not all of this to say that all true being only desig-
nates an ideal polarity which forms itself in the motivations of my
own transcendental life and can only be contained in it? Are not
also my fellow human beings and their psychic interiorities only
20 what they are as such unities of identity having their origin in my life
and only have a meaning correlated to my intentional experiences?
The other indeed lives his life, he can practice within himself the
transcendental reduction just as well as I can and can find himself
as absolute subjectivity and can apprehend me as /alter Ego /just as
25 well as I apprehend him in my life. As much as I am for myself, and
not only as an intentional occurrence in the other’s cognitive life,
the same holds, of course, /vice versa/. |
VIII, 185/186
Edmund Husserl, First Philosophy, 385
eidetisch 