Husserlian phenomenology must be at the forefront of phenomenological philosophy insofar as various new trends in research make awareness their point of departure. For example, there is a temptation to point to cognitive psychology as if it were scientific affirmation of phenomenology. Such a psychology is both empiricistic and speculative. Neither empiricism, emphasizing contingency of all facts, nor speculative rationalism, stressing conceptuality and universal necessity, are adequate to account for human concrete awareness. The former, with its “internal faculties” as psychological facts cannot account for the continuity and unity of experience. The latter can account neither for the unity of experience without positing the “I think” accompanying all representations, nor for individuality wherein such representations could be attributed as “mine.” In terms of philosophical anthropology, for empiricism the human would be a “factum brutum,” while for rationalism, the factual human would be an instance of a universal concept. Hence another task of Husserlian phenomenology consists of precise delimitation of what comprises an individual experience without it becoming solipsistic. Here the prospects for intersubjective awareness and dialogical phenomenology is an open field for research and philosophical grounding without reverting to transcendental idealism. At this level some of the Husserlian inadequacies will have to be admitted, above all the concept of “intentionality” that correlates to any objectivity but cannot account for the world horizon.