Logic, as Husserl sees it, is concerned in the first place with meanings (propositions, concepts) and with associated meaning-instantiating acts. Most importantly, it is concerned with that sort of deductively […]
This means that we should regard logical and mathematical laws as being independent of the human mind, and also as an autonomy of meanings.
Pure logic does not deal at all with “thoughts” or “judgings” as mental episodes but about a priori laws and conditions for any theory and any judgments whatsoever, conceived as […]
Husserl stated that logic has three strata, each further away from consciousness and psychology than those that precede it. The first stratum is what Husserl called a “morphology of meanings” […]
Husserl believed that truth-in-itself has as ontological correlate being-in-itself, just as meaning categories have formal-ontological categories as correlates. Logic is a formal theory of judgment, that studies the formal a […]
Moreover, the truth of the judgment is neither equivalent to nor dependent upon the psychological experience of clear evidence that accompanies the mental act embracing it.