value of the Kantian thinking

What, instead, marks the inner geniusb and value of the Kantian | VII, 224/225

thinkinga and the unheard-of novelty in history is that he is the
first to pose the problem of investigating the a priori conditions of
possibility for the fact that a cognizing (communicative) subjectivity
can come to the rightful conviction of the existence of a real world
5 and can cognize this world.

Edmund Husserl, First Philosophy, 407-408

Kant, however, drafted a transcendental-scientific theory of the
possibility in principle of the constructiona of a true objectivity in
transcendental subjectivity, or rather, of a first attempt, albeit very
10 one-sided and limited in its problematic, of creating here the most
necessary science, which makes comprehensible to us, through a
clarification of the essential conditions of the cognition of the world
taking place in pure subjectivity, the world itself in its actual and
true meaning.

Edmund Husserl, First Philosophy, 410

He is interested in
the necessary ontological formations that an objective reality is to
have if it is to be cognizable and if it is to be grounded in cognizable
truths valid in themselves, in rigorous sciences.

Edmund Husserl, First Philosophy, 410

<nb>That our nature is
spatiotemporal and obeys purely mathematical laws, that it is causal
25 and that an empirical science—which, however, is guided by math-
ematical method—is valid for it—this is no contingent /factum/. But
only when lawfulnesses of this type exist, something like a world
of objects can be experienced and determined from experience.</nb>
<nb>Thus, only for this reason can the cognizing agent rightfully claim to
30 presuppose a true nature in his cognitions, because the experienced
objects, in the manner in which they are experienced, have a mathe-
matical and natural-scientific structure. Without | such an ontological VII, 227/228
form [nature] could in no way be objectively determined.</nb>

Edmund Husserl, First Philosophy, 410

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