intersubjective cognizability

On the other hand, this continual “getting to know better” of a
world, which is /mine/, is not yet getting to know an intersubjective
world /for all/.
<nb>There is only one thing possible here: that all sensible determi-
10 nations stand in a lawful nexus with non-sensible determinations,
which are necessarily common to all rational subjects as subjects of
possible perception and experience.</nb>
<nb>The systems of locationa of space and time are necessarily com-
mon [to all], they must be, as principles of individuation, titles
15 for intersubjective cognizability in order that in general the same
objectivity be cognizable as the same. By the same token, all pri-
mary qualities—duration, spatial form, relative positions in space—
must be cognizable intersubjectively, despite their sensible, also
lived bodily-psychophysically determined manners of givenness.
20 In thought, which is necessary communal, real-mathematical con-
cepts need to correspond to them, as opposed to merely sensible
Of course we all share in common the entire material of formal-
logical and formal-ontological concepts, and of course [all of them]
25 in their relation to what is perceptually given, to what is real. But
here we have to consider, in complete generality, the forms of unity
and forms of the unfolding of the manifolds, such as sameness, dif-
ference, identity, connection to a whole, part and part in a whole,
substrate and accident, relation, and so on, which belong to any
30 conceivable intuition (not just external intuition) and to any con-
ceivable originally generating consciousness (as consciousness of
something objective of any form whatsoever); [to these forms also
belong] condition and what is conditioned, |, collective, disjunctive; VII, 223/224
in short, all that belongs, or can belong, to all possible sensible intu-
35 itions in activity and passivity and what is itself not “perception”:
a /Stellensysteme/
kant’s copernican turn
through all of which, to be sure, a special concept of perception,
intuition comes into relief /vis-à-vis /a broader concept.*

* a) I perceive a thing, I am directed at /it/, while I get to know, in the flux of my
perceptual experiences in which it is continually perceived, ever new features, or
rather, I get to know /it /in these as its determinations.
b) “A thing comes to appearance” to me and affects me, I tend toward perception in
the sense of (a), I have a potential perception, which is transformed into an actual
one in the effectuation of this tendency.

Edmund Husserl, First Philosophy


Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s