It is evident from the
outset that what I call, in the natural attitude, an object /simpliciter/,
an objective nexus, a state of affairs, and so on, [any object] of which
I can ever know, that is real for me in any way possible, that (I say)
every such objectivity is a unity of identity, intentionally conscious
25 in manifold actual or possible conscious experiences. In all of these
experiences, this objectivity is meant, in all of them it is—regardless
of the very different modes of subjective appearances—meant as its
identical objective meaning and in the mode of certainty of belief.
That what is meant is in all of these modes the same is to say that
30 such manifold conscious experiences with their manifold modi-
fied manners of appearances produce, in synthetic concatenation,
an overarching consciousness of one and the same existing object,
which, however, can only be conscious in different subjective modes.
Of course there are cases, and it is a known type of possible occur-
35 rences |, that such a synthetic consciousness cannot retain its unity VIII, 183/184
of identity, that two different consciousnesses aim, at first, at a unity
of meaning, but that they separate themselves in conflict, and that,
then, in further occurrences to be described in greater detail, not
part two · section four · chapter three
only the certainty of belief becomes modified to mere assumption
and doubt, but that also the consciousness of naught, so to speak, of
the crossing out of being, arises.
Edmund Husserl, First Philosophy