How does thinking get a hold of things

20 Let us assume that things (/Sachen/) exist in truth and reality. And,
obviously, this assumption seems enough to us. It does not occur to us
to state it. Things are in their own right. On the other hand, thinking
gets a hold of them, thinks them, knows them, is certain of their
existence, or presumes them, posits them as existing with the highest

25 degree of probability. The most obvious situation in the world. /Is
there anything more trivial than these facts/? Unfortunately, it is the
fate of philosophy to have to find the biggest problems in the biggest
trivialities. How does thinking in its various forms (the question is in
the end the same for each one) get a hold of things, since they are

30 surely things existing in their own right? How does it concur with
the nature of the things in the form of justified knowledge? Things are
surely what and how they are in their own right. Does knowledge capture
them and haul <them> into subjectivity? Or does it picture things, carry
an image into itself, faithfully reflecting the nature of
35 things in the case of cogent knowledge?

Edmund Husserl, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, 148

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