critique of knowledge

For the moment, we maintain that a sphere of absolute givenness can be
indicated at the very outset. And it is precisely this sphere that we need if it is
to be possible for us to envision a theory of knowledge. Indeed, our lack of
clarity with regard to the sense or essence of knowledge requires a science of
knowledge, a science that dedicates itself solely to getting clear on the essence
of knowledge. It will not explain knowledge as a psychological fact; it will not
investigate the natural conditions under which acts of knowledge come and
go, or the natural laws by which they originate and change. To investigate
such things is the task that a positive science sets for itself, the natural science
of mental facts, of the experiences of the individual minds that undergo them.
Rather, the critique of knowledge seeks to clarify, to bring to light, the essence
of knowledge and the legitimacy of its claim to validity, a claim that belongs
to its essence. And what else can this mean than to bring the essence of
knowledge to direct self-givenness?

Edmund Husserl, Idea of Phenomenology, 25

But all knowledge is put in question
here, since the critique of knowledge takes as its problem the possibility of
knowledge as such and its ability to make contact with objectivity. [26]

What is ”placed in question”
is knowledge in general. But that is not to deny that there is any knowledge at
all- for that would lead to an absurdity. Rather, it is to say that knowledge
contains within itself a certain problem, namely, how it is possible for it to achieve what we usually take it to achieve: contact with objectivity. [26-27]

One could at the outset characterize the task of
critique of knowledge as one of providing a solution to the problem of
transcendence, thereby giving this new discipline its preliminary delimitation,
instead of giving a more general characterization of its theme as the problem
of the essence of knowledge as such. [28]

Apparently his thought is this: knowing is something other
than the known object; knowing is given, but the known object is not given;
and yet knowing is supposed to relate to the object, to know it. How can I
understand this possibility? [29]

The phenomenon in this sense falls under the law to which we must subject
ourselves in the critique of knowledge, the law of the epoche in relation to everything transcendent. [33-34]

What is in question, then, is how this objectivity can nonetheless be posited,
and what sense it has, and may have, if such positing should be possible. [35]

The relating-itself-to-something-transcendent, to refer to
it in one way or another, is an inner characteristic of the phenomenon. [35]

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