Kant’s solution to the /quid juris/ in the /Critique of Pure Reason/ was
the argument of the “Transcendental Deduction” (in the “Analytic of
Concepts”) that concepts like causality are “conditions of the
possibility of experience,” because they are the rules by which
perception and experience are united into a single consciousness,
through a mental activity called “synthesis.”
In
Kant the notion of intuition originally seems to be the equivalent of
perception and perceptual knowledge [/Critique of Pure Reason/, Norman
Kemp Smith translation, St. Martin’s Press, 1965, p. 65]. The conception
becomes confused, however, when Kant himself appears to conclude that
perception cannot be knowledge, or even perception, without the mental
activity of synthesis [/ibid./, pp. 129-150, the famous “Transcendental
Deduction” in the first edition of the /Critique of Pure Reason/]. The
conclusion would reduce “intuition” to no more than a pre-conscious
receptivity of the senses. Intuition as “immediate” knowledge would also
thus become impossible, since knowledge would require the /mediation/ of
the intellect to become knowledge.
[The Foundations of Value, the Friesian Trilemma](http://www.friesian.com/foundatn.htm)
eidetisch 