Constancy occurs not because there are, in addition to individual realia, abstract essences which somehow reappear, identically, in different objects. And nor does it occur because of some not further explicable propensity of subjects to use general terms in certain ways. Constancy occurs, rather – or at least this is the core of the Brentano-Husserl view – because objects have real parts or moments (‘respects’) which stand to each other in relations of perfect similarity.

Barry Smith, Husserl, Language, and the Ontology of the Act (


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