intimacies of the phenomenologically pure subjectivity

A first entering—so to speak, into the intimacies of the phe-
nomenologically pure subjectivity—cannot be but very difficult,
10 and this is so precisely because we are dealing here with currently
lived life, in its being-for-itself and being-in-itself: Life of the I, this
is: to be consciously related to any given objectivities, and among
these, to be related in a special manner of specific acts. As a wak-
ing I, it is directed at objects in these acts, and it is occupied with
15 them in cognition, valuing, action. In natural life—I mean here prior
to the motives taking effect, which force the transition into the
phenomenological attitude—everybody knows of his egoic life, he
knows of his egoic relatednesses and his manifold real and ideal
objectivities. He knows of them from natural reflection. But /the latter/
20 can never yield a knowledge of pure subjectivity, one cannot even
glean it from here. For it is its nature always to have objectivities—
through a previous and /retained /objective knowledge—and now
to relate the reflectively grasped I as act subject to these objectiv-
ities, whereby, in addition, the I itself is apprehended and posited
25 as objectively human. In this natural reflection one cannot see (as
long as it is exclusively dominant) that every having of objects and
every determination in experience and thought, in which they exist
for the I, is itself already an achievement of the I and its conscious
life, and that at all times the I in its own life and doing essential to
30 it—in its sensually experiencing, thinking, valuing, actively creating
and other acts—brings about in itself and for itself the appearance
and validity of objects. Hence, consciousness itself, intentional life,
as it lives in itself |, as these and those subjective apperceptions VIII, 120/121
with their corresponding characters of subjective validities arise in
35 it from purely essential motivations belonging to it—[all of this]
remains necessarily hidden; this entire life, through which for me
my respective world—things, humans, values, works, human actions,
part two · section three · chapter three
socialities, and so on—are there for me as with one stroke, but upon
closer inspection, they only exist for me in communication with
others, so that we are referred, here, to the community of the I’s, and
of all I’s or their intersubjective and unified life, which functions as
5 this intersubjectively constituting life.

Edmund Husserl, First Philosophy

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