To Look at the Genesis of Sinnbildung

One of Husserl’s most successful concepts is that of genesis or genetic phenomenology. This includes another dimension of Sinnbildung: while static phenomenology deals with validities, genetic phenomenology investigates the genesis of these validities. Again, the transcendental perspective is crucial because the genetic structure reveals the conditions of the possibility of experience by starting from experience itself. Investigating the fundamental conditions of consciousness in the genetic perspective renders the key features how to think and conceptualize a core form of subjectivity. It gives an outline of the most passive layers of fungierender Intentionalität and shows the importance of association, affection and succession in Sinnbildung not only on a psychological but on a transcendental level. The striking characteristic feature of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is the elaboration of a prepredicative sphere which in itself already shows structures of receptivity that have a preparing character for the entry of spontaneity. As Husserl has demonstrated this for logical categories, the whole life of reason with its justifying features could be newly understood from the prepredicative sphere. Husserl offers a possibility to speak about reason without the exclusion of sensibility or, more precise, to speak of reason within a subject that is also determined and pre-structured by its receptivity. This also allows a comprehensive approach on intersubjectivity that embraces all dimensions from the affective to the reasonable in ethic and social life.
    Through the genetic question the issue of Sinnbildung reaches a profoundness that cannot be neglected in future philosophical discussions on any question that concerns subjectivity and intersubjectivity and its constitution of a meaningful world.

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