In a significant point of agreement with Husserl, and Heidegger as well, Searle rejects the idea that the object of an intentional state is a mental representation.  Since what is most revolutionary about the phenomenological theory of intentionality is precisely its abandonment of all traces of a mental representation that is supposed to mediate between consciousness and our knowledge of the external world, Searle, on this point, is more phenomenologically relevant than he is perhaps willing to admit.  Consider, for example, the following observation by Searle on the nature of the intentional object, take from his work Intentionality (p. 16):  “To call something an Intentional object is just to say that is what some Intentional state is about.  Thus, for example, if Bill admires President Clinton, then the Intentional object of his admiration is President Carter, the actual man and not some shadowy intermediate entity between Bill and the man.”

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