Critisisms of Husserlian phenomenoloigy

To articulate the prospects for Husserlian phenomenology first we must suggest briefly the points of contention his work has provoked in major trends which, as a matter of fact, are aspects of and inspired by his opus. In this sense one current requirement of Husserlian phenomenology is to take to task the various attacks on his work, not to demonstrate by arguments that they are wrong, but to investigate the undisclosed prejudgments in awareness that such attacks contain. We know that from Heidegger through various hermeneutical systems, to deconstruction and post-modernity, Husserl’s thought was the main target for criticisms on whose basis the careers of such attacks were made. Thus, the first claim suggests that Husserl’s understanding of Being is impoverished in contrast to his epistemic focus of establishing a domain of absolute awareness founded on transcendental ego. In this sense, his phenomenology is not a presuppositionless science, but a Cartesian reduction of Being to being known. Another aspect that supposedly discredits Husserl’s claims is the impossibility to obtain apodictic evidence of retentional dimension of temporal experience and the radical difference of the other’s experience. Unable to eradicate these difficulties, Husserl attempts to support his claim to absolute evidence by accepting, uncritically, the language of presence that pervades the metaphysical legacy of the West. Finally, and despite his discovery of the life-world, both his method and content of his researches are Western, and even epistemically imperialistic. After all, all cultural and historical differences are subsumed by him under the claim that phenomenology is the secret longing of the Greco-European man. These contentions require a brief response and above all an opening to the future tasks for Husserlian phenomenology.

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